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This report forms part of a wider study on “Policy Research – Implications of 
Liberalisation of Fish Trade for Developing Countries”, comprising five trade issues 
background papers and five country case studies. 
 
The trade issues background papers are dealing with the following topics: 
· Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) Measures and Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT) 
· Ethical/Social/Eco Certification, Labelling and Guidelines 
· The Impact of Subsidies on Trade in Fisheries Products 
· The Impact of Dumping on Trade in Fisheries Products 
· Fiscal Reforms and Trade in Fisheries Products 
 
The case studies cover the following countries: 
· Bangladesh 
· Guinea 
· India 
· Uganda 
· Vietnam 
 
For a synthesis of the entire study including policy recommendations, see: 
Bostock, T., Greenhalgh, P. and Kleih, U. (2004), Policy Research – Implications of 
Liberalisation of Fish Trade for Developing Countries – Synthesis Report.  Chatham, 
UK: Natural Resources Institute.  ISBN 0 85954 560-1. 
 
Copies of the various reports are available on the following websites: 
· www.onefish.org/id/225570 
· www.nri.org/projects/projects/htm 
 
The study was funded by the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (BMZ), and the UK’s Department for International Development 
(DFID). 
 
The views expressed in this report are solely those of the author and do not 
necessarily represent the views of BMZ, DFID, FAO or GTZ. 
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FISCAL REFORMS AND TRADE IN FISHERIES PRODUCTS 1 
 
In October 2003, the Support unit for International Fisheries and Aquatic Research 
(SIFAR) organised a 'Workshop and Exchange of Views on Fiscal Reforms for 
Fisheries: To Promote Growth, Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Management'. 
This took place in the context of a wider OECD-DAC initiative aimed at examining 
issues related to environmental fiscal reform (EFR) for sustainable development and 
poverty reduction. Taking ideas from that workshop, this brief paper examines fiscal 
reforms in the context of sustainable international trade in fisheries. It concludes by 
noting that the achievement of sustainable and equitable international trade is 
dependant upon the existence of effective national (and regional) fisheries 
management systems. 
 
The rationale underlying fisheries management, exploitation and development is 
beginning to change. Where once the focus was primarily on producing greater 
quantities of fish, the emphasis is now gradually moving, through concepts such as 
responsible fishing and sustainable management, towards wealth and revenue 
generation and their appropria te distribution. This change in focus presents new 
challenges to fisheries administrations. The wealth that aquatic resources are capable 
of generating means that the fisheries sector has the potential to contribute –
sometimes very substantially- to growth and poverty reduction.  Appropriate 
governance and fiscal arrangements for fisheries management using principles of 
economic efficiency, can be instrumental in achieving this: first, by helping to control 
the overall level of effort and second, by encouraging effort reallocation between 
fisheries.  
 
The OECD noted that although scope exists for further trade liberalization, 
sustainable benefits can only accrue from this if efficient fisheries management 
systems are in place (OECD 2003)2.  A key conclusion of this study was that ‘policies 
should target market liberalization and improvements in fisheries management 
simultaneously, in a coherent and comprehensive manner’.  Fiscal reforms are 
therefore relevant to international trade inasmuch as they may be expected to lead to 
the emergence of more effective management systems upon which sustainable trade 
can then be based. There is a critical need both to enhance awareness amongst 
decision makers and the wider public that the concepts of good management practice 
and responsible fisheries trade must run hand in hand if economic and associated 
benefits are to accrue. In particular, policy choices by (fish exporting) developing 
countries based on short-term gains need to be carefully considered within a bleak 
context of long-term failure. Such failure, often associated with unmanaged open 
access fisheries, is wide-ranging and exemplified by environmental despoliation, 
diminishing economic returns, and increasing food and livelihood insecurity. Fiscal 
reforms are compelling governance instruments that can be used in tackling such 
outcomes through ensuring that a proportion of the potential (or actual) wealth from 
fisheries is captured and redeployed in addressing externalities.  
                                                 
1 This paper was prepared by Tim Bostock of Support unit for International Fisheries and Aquatic 
Research (SIFAR) 
2 Liberalising fisheries markets: scope and effects, OECD, 2003 
 4 
 
Implementing fiscal reforms, however, requires a turn-around in political thinking. 
For years, policymakers faced with dwindling fisheries have responded all too readily 
to calls from fishers for subsidies which have further contributed to overcapacity and 
overexploitation. Fiscal reforms call for bold policy choices that reverse such transfers 
and begin putting the potential (or implicit) wealth of resources to alternative use for 
the benefit of society. A key challenge is to identify and implement appropriate 
institutional arrangements that will enable this to take place. 
 
It is now accepted that promoting a better understanding of the key role of resource 
rent3 is a key element in successful fisheries management. Rents can either be the 
driving force leading to overcapacity and overfishing, or they can be the basis for 
generating wealth and revenue. The apparently limited extent to which many policy 
makers are aware of this, or recognise latent value of rents, is a critical factor 
affecting management performance. Continuing ignorance will keep fisheries policy 
reform as a low priority, and will ensure that the potential for fisheries to contribute to 
development and welfare objectives remains unrealised. 
 
In considering the development and liberalization of trade, an important policy choice 
by governments is to derive estimates of existing and potential (assuming 
economically rational management) values of fisheries [rents] and consider this 
information in subsequent policy processes aimed at establishing effective 
management systems. A crucial element of this will be to define appropriate sharing 
of rent between resource owners (generally government) and exploiters. Again, this 
takes political courage, as a logical outcome might involve significant restructuring, 
including the institution of new management regimes that may be unpopular as they 
are likely to involve both winners and losers – approaches involving ‘short-term pain, 
long-term gain’ are generally inconsistent with quick-fix/short-term political 
perspectives. 
 
The allocation of permanent, enforceable and tradable fishing rights is now generally 
accepted as an enabling tool for sustainable fisheries management. Rights permit 
several key questions to be addressed including value and availability of resource 
rents (rent values are revealed through rights trading), ownership of the resource and 
the share of rent that owners may take, and who may exploit the resource. 
 
Assuming new fiscal arrangements are instituted with appropriate management 
instruments in place that allow rent to be generated; several choices can then be made 
regarding the use of these rents. They can for example be used in pro-poor policies to 
create alternative employment opportunities, education and training programmes, or 
even continued ‘subsidies’ to particularly vulnerable groups 4.  Rents can be used more 
directly to support trade through investments in alternative employment (e.g. 
processing, value-added), trade promotion and market research. Alternatively, the 
choice can be made to ensure rents remain (dissipated) within the fisheries. Continued 
free and open access in small-scale fisheries can use the inherent wealth of the fishery 
to address welfare objectives.  
 
                                                 
3 For a useful key sheet briefing on rents in fisheries (and more generally on fiscal reforms see 
(reference needed).  
4 Such ‘subsidies’ should better be thought of as redistribution  of wealth generated from the fisheries. 
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Whatever the scenario, some form of management system will always be required as a 
prerequisite of sustainable trade, to ensure that the resources are not over-fished (costs 
approximate to revenues). These are important choices from a political-economy 
perspective, and require an understanding of the trade-offs between efficiency and 
equity/welfare.   
 
The OECD study (ibid.) identifies six cases where the effects of market liberalization 
on trade and resources may be of particular concern. These are: aquaculture; shared 
stocks; high seas fisheries not subject to management; fisheries under bilateral access 
agreements; underexploited fisheries; and multi-species fisheries.  The study 
recommends policy makers should pay particular attention to these cases as they 
represent situations where ‘market liberalization is most likely to elicit a supply 
response and hence where complimentary targeted sector policies should be in place if 
welfare gains are to be optimised’.  Although trade measures are increasingly being 
used in support of fisheries management and conservation purposes, at both national 
and/or international level (e.g. SPS, TBT, social, ethical and environmental labelling), 
the extent to which these are being implemented ‘in a coherent and comprehensive 
manner’ is arguable. Although there is a body of opinion emerging that labelling is 
overstated as an issue, evidence from existing impacts of other non-tariff barriers to 
trade shows that labeling has the potential to impact negatively on the livelihoods of 
the more vulnerable members in fisheries systems (see other papers for discussion on 
this). It is also increasingly clear that labeling should perhaps be better considered as 
an eventual outcome of efficient management systems (developed through improved 
national institutional capacity), rather than as an external driver of these.  
 
Evidently, more work is needed to understand the links (and by implication, the 
inconsistencies) between international trading regimes and national governance and 
management systems aimed at sustainable exploitation, particularly in the six cases 
noted above.  
 
 
 
